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Abstract 
We examined the influence of co-witness discussion on the meta-cognitive regulation 
of memory reports. Participants (N = 92) watched a crime video. Later, a confederate 
confidently agreed with (gave confirming feedback), disagreed with (gave 
disconfirming feedback), or gave no feedback (control) regarding participants’ 
answers to questions about the video. Participants who received disconfirming 
feedback reported fewer fine-grain details than participants in the confirming and 
control conditions on a subsequent, individual recall test for a different question set. 
Unexpectedly, this decrease in fine-grain reporting was not accompanied by a 
decrease in participants’ confidence in the accuracy of their fine-grain responses. 
These results indicate that receiving social comparative feedback about one’s memory 
performance can affect rememberers’ metamemorial control decisions, and potentially 
decrease the level of detail they volunteer in later memory reports. Further research is 
needed to assess whether these results replicate under different experimental 
conditions, and to explore the effects of social influences on metamemory. 
 
 
Key words: metacognition, eyewitness memory, social influence, co-witness 
discussion, memory reporting  
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The effects of co-witness discussion on confidence and precision in eyewitness 
memory reports 
It is a well-established finding in the eyewitness literature that memory reports can be 
distorted by exposure to post-event information (PEI; Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 
2011; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). Eyewitnesses sometimes incorporate PEI in 
their reports following discussions with co-witnesses, exhibiting memory conformity 
(Gabbert & Hope, 2013; Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003). There are several reasons 
why memory conformity between co-witnesses may occur. In some instances, one 
witness may report details learned from another in order to avoid the perceived social 
costs of disagreeing (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), a form of conformity known as 
normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Memory conformity may also be the 
result of informational influence, which occurs when one person reports information 
she has learned from another because she feels this information is accurate (Deutsch 
& Gerard, 1955). Finally, memory conformity may be the result of memory distortion 
(Gabbert, Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & Jamieson, 2012). Witnesses may report 
details learned through discussion with a co-witness because they have forgotten the 
source of the information (source misattribution; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994).  
Memory conformity resulting from normative and informational social 
influences does not necessarily reflect an alteration of the memory itself, but rather, of 
the memory report (Blank, 2009; Blank, Walther & Isemann, 2017). According to the 
revised dual-criterion model, the content of memory reports is determined through 
metacognitive monitoring and control (Ackermann & Goldsmith, 2008; Goldsmith, 
Koriat, & Weinberg-Eliezer, 2002; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). When reporting 
information from memory, people subjectively assess their confidence in the accuracy 
of candidate responses, as well as how informative they are likely to be for a receiver 
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through monitoring (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008). They then set subjective cutoffs 
(criteria) for accuracy and informativeness that must be met in order for a candidate 
response to be reported—this is known as control. Control criteria can be met by 
adjusting the precision (level of detail, or grain size) of a response, such as by 
reporting either detailed fine-grain (e.g. the sweater was navy blue) or less detailed 
coarse-grain (e.g. the sweater was dark) information. Essentially, the rememberer 
starts with as detailed a candidate response as can be retrieved from memory, and 
adjusts the grain-size of the response (making it coarser as necessary) until it meets 
both accuracy and informativeness criteria. Candidate responses that do not meet 
these criteria are withheld, which can improve the accuracy of memory reports  
(Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996).  
Eyewitness reports can make a critical contribution to the success of criminal 
investigations (Semmler, Brewer, & Bradfield Douglass, 2012); it is therefore 
important to understand if and how PEI exchanged between co-witnesses influences 
the metacognitive processes that govern memory reporting. The possible effects of 
co-witness discussion on metacognitive monitoring and control of memory reporting 
have yet to be empirically tested. In the present experiment, we manipulated 
agreement/disagreement with a co-witness and examined its effect on participants’ 
monitoring of the accuracy of their candidate responses (measured by self-reported 
confidence) and control (measured by the quantity and precision of the information 
they chose to report). It is important to note that the focus of the present research is 
memory reporting, or what witnesses say when questioned about their memory for an 
event, as opposed to their actual memory for the event (which may include more 
information or different details than they choose to explicitly report). Although there 
is research evidence that memory for events can be altered through discussion (see 
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Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012, for a review), our focus is on how discussion between co-
witnesses may affect memory reports, specifically through its potential effects on the 
metacognitive monitoring and control processes responsible for the selection of 
reported details.  
The Effects of Co-witness Discussion on Memory Reports  
To examine the effects of post-event discussion between co-witnesses on their 
individual memory reports, many studies have used a paradigm in which members of 
a co-witness dyad are exposed to versions of stimuli that differ in some respects 
(critical items) (Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2007; 
Wright et al., 2000, Experiment 2; Wright, Gabbert, Memon, & London, 2008). They 
are then instructed to discuss what they have seen prior to having their recall tested. 
Members of each co-witness dyad are given the impression that they have seen the 
same stimuli, when in fact they have each seen a different version. For example, in 
Gabbert et al. (2003), participants watched one of two videos of a theft shot from 
different perspectives, each of which included unique details. Results showed that 
over 70% of participants later reported details they had not seen in the video, but were 
only exposed to through discussion with their co-witness. Subsequent research has 
replicated Gabbert et al.’s findings, demonstrating a robust memory conformity effect 
(Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 2009). 
In an alternative paradigm, Meade and Roediger (2002) showed participant 
and confederate dyads pictures of typical household scenes. In a collaborative recall 
phase, confederates named some items that had not actually appeared in the scenes. 
Later, when participants completed an individual recall test, they sometimes 
incorporated items that had been mentioned by confederates but were not actually 
present in the original scenes. These results demonstrate the contamination of 
 7 
memory reports through verbal interaction, which Meade and Roediger (2002) termed 
social contagion of memory. While the terms social contagion and memory 
conformity have be used interchangeably, we have used the term memory conformity 
throughout this paper to maintain consistency. 
Certain factors may increase the likelihood, or predict the occurrence, of 
memory conformity. For example, Gabbert, Memon, Allan, and Wright (2004) found 
that PEI encountered through face-to-face communication was more misleading than 
PEI embedded in a written narrative. Further studies have shown that witnesses who 
volunteer information first in the course of a discussion are more likely to influence 
their co-witnesses’ memory reports, and that members of co-witness dyads are more 
likely to conform to information provided by the more confident member (Gabbert et 
al., 2006, Experiment 1; Wright et al., 2000). Gabbert et al. (2007) found that 
participants’ beliefs about the quality of their memory in comparison to a co-
witnesses’ affected their susceptibility to misinformation. Participants who were told 
they had encoded a set of pictures for half as long as a co-witness were more likely to 
report erroneous details mentioned by that co-witness than were participants told they 
had encoded the pictures for twice as long. Participants who believed they had seen 
pictures for twice as long mentioned more details during a discussion with a co-
witness, and were more likely to mention critical items first. More recently, research 
on memory conformity has found that both directly (via a co-witness) and indirectly 
(in a written report) encountered PEI can result in memory conformity (Blank et al., 
2013); that conformity effects are increased when the source of information is seen as 
highly credible (Horry, Palmer, Sexton, & Brewer, 2012); and that participants’ 
confidence in the accuracy of their memory reports can be influenced by a 
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confederate’s expressed confidence (Goodwin, Hannah, Nicholl, & Ferri, 2017; 
Goodwin, Kukucka, & Hawks, 2013; Thorley & Kumar, 2017).  
Individuals sometimes seek information from external sources to bolster the 
accuracy and informativeness of their recall when internal evidence is weak (Bless, 
Strack, & Walther, 2000; Horry et al., 2012; Jaeger, Lauris, Selmeczy, & Dobbins, 
2012). Jaeger et al. (2012) examined the influence of judgments made by external 
sources on participants’ memory. In two experiments, participants completed a 
computerized recognition task in which they had to identify words on a list as 
previously studied (‘old’) or newly presented (‘new’). For some of the words, 
participants were shown a bogus judgment made by peers on screen just before the 
target word. The cues were accurate on 75% of trials for one of the sources 
(“reliable”), and 50% of trials for the other source (“unreliable”). Results showed that 
participants conformed to judgments made by the “unreliable” source about as often 
as they conformed to judgments made by the “reliable” source, indicating that they 
did not seem to distinguish between the reliability of the two sources. Thus, it seems 
that in a social comparative context, people are not very good at determining the 
recall accuracy of others. Furthermore, participants conformed to judgments made by 
the external sources when their confidence in the accuracy of their own memory was 
low. This strategy, referred to as low confidence outsourcing, meant that while 
conformity to cues from the “reliable” source improved accuracy, conformity to cues 
from the “unreliable” source neither hindered nor improved accuracy relative to 
participants’ baseline recognition performance.  
In an adaptation of the paradigm used by Jaeger et al. (2012), Zawadzka, 
Krogulska, Button, and Higham (2015) found that participants still conformed to 
judgments from external sources when they had the option to withhold responses 
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(Experiments 1 and 2). However, participants’ decisions to withhold certain responses 
were not influenced by the cues from the sources—in other words, the manipulation 
resulted in memory conformity but not metamemory conformity. They also found that 
when participants were given feedback regarding the accuracy of the sources, they 
were able to distinguish between the reliable and unreliable source, as evidenced by 
their metacognitive control decisions (Experiment 3). Following this feedback, 
participants conformed to the judgments of the reliable source more often than those 
of the unreliable source, and also withheld more responses on trials with a cue from 
an unreliable source compared to trials with a cue from a reliable source (Zawadzka et 
al., 2015).  
The results of Jaeger et al., (2012) and Zawadzka et al., (2015; Experiment 1) 
show that people strategically use information from external sources to bolster their 
own memory. While people are more likely to conform to sources they perceive as 
reliable, overall, people are poor judges of source reliability. In the real world, 
rememberers usually have no objective indications of an external sources’ reliability. 
The low confidence outsourcing strategy can therefore lead rememberers to 
incorporate potentially errant post-event information (PEI) when they cannot 
confidently recall certain details. Memory conformity may not affect metamemory 
however, as Zawadzka et al. (2015; Experiments 1 and 2) found that when source 
reliability was undetermined, memory conformity occurred without influencing 
response withholding. 
Metacognitive Monitoring and Control of Memory Reports 
Once a memory has been retrieved and reconstructed, rememberers determine 
which details to report through metacognitive monitoring and control (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996). A few studies have examined the effects of metacognitive 
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monitoring and control on eyewitness reports of episodic memories (Evans & Fisher, 
2011; McCallum, Brewer, & Weber, 2016; Sauer & Hope, 2016; Weber & Brewer, 
2008). The two-phase paradigm used in most of these studies was adapted from 
Koriat and Goldsmith (1996). In the first phase of the paradigm, participants give 
fine- and coarse-grain answers to questions, and provide ratings of their confidence in 
the accuracy of these answers (0-100%); in the second phase, they select one of their 
answers as a preferred response, and are sometimes given the option to withhold a 
response. Using this paradigm, in two experiments, Weber and Brewer (2008) found 
that the level of detail participants chose to report was related to their confidence in 
their fine-grain answers. If participants were highly confident that a detailed answer 
was accurate, they were more likely to report it.  
McCallum et al. (2016) investigated grain size volunteering and recall 
confidence in different social conditions. In two experiments, participants answered 
questions about a witnessed mock crime in the two-phase question format. The results 
of Experiment 1 showed that confidence significantly predicted response accuracy. 
Furthermore, participants who were told that their responses would remain private 
were nearly twice as likely to volunteer fine-grain responses as participants who were 
told that they would have to respond to questions publicly. In Experiment 2, a 
monetary incentive with penalties for inaccurate responses was introduced. When 
there was no penalty for inaccurate reporting, participants showed a bias for 
volunteering fine-grain answers. The results of these two experiments suggest that the 
presence of others, and the potential for negative consequences for inaccuracy can 
alter rememberer’s control strategies. 
Metacognitive monitoring and control can also be influenced by conditions at 
encoding. Sauer and Hope (2016) examined the strategic regulation of memory 
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reporting for information encoded in conditions of full and divided attention. They 
found that participants in the divided attention condition provided fewer fine-grain 
responses, volunteered less accurate fine-grain responses, and expressed lower 
confidence in their fine-grain responses than participants in the full attention 
condition. Therefore, while participants in the divided attention condition monitored 
the accuracy of their responses successfully, they chose to sacrifice accuracy for 
informativeness. In line with the revised dual-criterion model, findings from these 
experiments show that individuals place a heavy emphasis on informativeness.  
In an attempt to be as informative as possible, individuals may draw on 
information from various sources, including PEI they have encountered through 
discussion with co-witnesses. Individuals control the content of their memory reports 
through metacognitive monitoring and control, and can improve the accuracy and 
informativeness of their reports by these means. It is therefore possible that co-
witness discussion affects memory reporting through its influence on the 
metacognitive processes underlying the selection of reported details. We examined 
whether disagreement among participants over details of a jointly witnessed mock 
crime event influenced their metacognitive regulation of their memory reports. 
Investigating metacognitive decisions that potentially underlie memory conformity 
can inform the development of investigative interviewing techniques. Additionally, 
such an investigation may further our understanding of how metamemorial 
monitoring and control operate under various conditions, which is of theoretical 
value. 
In the current experiment, we examined the effects of social comparative 
feedback provided by a co-witness on participants’ (a) confidence in the accuracy of 
their recall, (b) volunteering of fine- and coarse-grain responses, (c) withholding of 
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responses, and (d) response accuracy on a subsequent memory assessment. Our 
primary interest was not the actual content/accuracy of individual responses – but 
rather whether the social manipulation affected confidence, thereby influencing the 
selection of details to be volunteered or withheld. We predicted that, relative to 
confirming feedback and no feedback, receiving disconfirming feedback from a co-
witness would decrease participants’ confidence in the accuracy of their memory at 
Phase I, and therefore reduce the proportion of fine-grain responses they volunteered 
at Phase II (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008; Weber & Brewer, 2008). We expected 
that participants who received confirming feedback would show increased confidence 
in the accuracy of their answers at Phase I, and therefore be likely to volunteer more 
fine-grain responses at Phase II than participants in the disconfirming feedback group. 
We also examined the effect of feedback on participants’ withholding of details. 
Lower confidence in the accuracy of a candidate response reduces the chances that it 
will be reported (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008), so we predicted that participants 
who received disconfirming feedback would withhold more responses than 
participants in the confirming and no feedback groups. Participants in this experiment 
were not given misinformation about details they were subsequently questioned 
about; this was done so that we could examine the potential effects of disagreement 
between co-witnesses during a discussion on their subsequent memory reports 
independently of the misinformation effect. We therefore expected that the accuracy 
of participants’ answers to questions on the cued recall task would not be affected by 
the manipulation. 
Method 
Design 
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In a between-subjects design, we manipulated feedback across three 
conditions: confirming feedback (n = 32), disconfirming feedback (n = 30), or no 
feedback (n = 30), and examined the effects on participants’ confidence, the grain size 
of the details they volunteered, and their withholding of details.  
Participants 
 Ninety-two individuals participated in the study (64 females, 28 males, Mage = 
30.1 years; SD = 12.9). Sample size was determined based on sample sizes used in 
similar studies (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008; Weber & Brewer, 2008). Participants 
were university staff and students. Criteria for participation included being 18 years of 
age or older, being fluent in English, and having normal, or corrected to normal 
vision. Ethical approval for the experiment was obtained from the university’s science 
faculty research ethics committee. 
Materials 
Stimulus event. Participants viewed a three-minute video event depicting a 
theft. In the event, a man gains access to an elderly couple’s home under the pretense 
of adjusting their electricity meter. He distracts them while an accomplice 
surreptitiously enters the house and steals valuables from the second floor of the 
property.   
Recall questions. Questions included in the practice task and the cued recall 
task referred to details from the video. In the practice task, participants were asked to 
provide both fine- and coarse-grain written answers to six questions. They were also 
asked to provide a rating of their confidence in the accuracy of each answer on a scale 
of 0-100% (10% increments). These questions referred to the male victim in the video 
(e.g., “What was the colour of the male victim’s vest?” A fine-grain answer to this 
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question might be “navy blue”, while a coarse-grain answer might be “dark”). The 
practice task questions were presented in a paper booklet. 
 The cued recall task was modeled after the standard two-phase approach used 
in previous studies of metacognitive monitoring and control of memory reports 
(Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008; Goldsmith et al., 2002; Weber & Brewer, 2008). The 
task was comprised of 22 cued recall questions (e.g., What colour was the getaway 
car?; How many items did the perpetrators steal from the home?), and was completed 
electronically. None of the questions in the practice task were repeated in the cued 
recall task. 
Pilot testing 
Prior to data collection, we conducted a pilot focus group session with six 
volunteer participants (all female, aged 18-25 years) who watched the stimulus video 
used in the experiment on individual laptops, with sound played through headphones. 
Afterwards, they were asked to write their answers to the six practice task questions 
used in experiment. After completing the practice task, participants were then asked 
to rate the difficulty of each question on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very easy) to 
7 (very difficult). On the basis of these ratings, two questions were classified as ‘easy’ 
(average rating between 1-2); two questions as medium difficulty (average rating 
between 3-5); and two questions as difficult (average rating between 6-7). To select 
our critical items for the experiment, we judged that having a confederate disagree 
with answers that seemed blatantly obvious (easy questions) might raise participants’ 
suspicions about the authenticity of the manipulation. We also thought it might be 
suspicious for confederates to produce the exact same answers to questions that the 
participants perceived to be very difficult to recall. We therefore decided that in order 
to uphold the plausibility and integrity of the experimental manipulation, agreement 
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and disagreement by the confederate should not be complete, but rather, should be 
with the majority (4/6) of the participants’ responses. Thus, in the confirming 
condition, confederates were instructed to agree with the participant’s answers to four 
of the six questions, but to disagree with their answers to the two questions rated most 
difficult to answer by the pilot focus group. In the disconfirming condition, 
confederates were instructed to disagree with four of the participant’s answers, but to 
agree with their answers to the two questions rated easiest to answer by the pilot focus 
group. Confederates were told to respond as instructed regardless of the actual 
accuracy of participant’s responses. In nearly all of the studies we have reviewed in 
which a confederate was used to provide feedback or introduce misinformation, 
agreement or disagreement between the confederate and participants was not 
complete (e.g., Meade & Roediger, 2002; Goodwin et al., 2017).  
Procedure 
After signing an informed consent form, participants were randomly allocated 
to one of the three conditions (confirming feedback, disconfirming feedback, no 
feedback). Participants in all conditions viewed the videos as part of a dyad. 
Participants in the no feedback condition viewed the video with another participant 
while participants in the disconfirming and confirming feedback conditions viewed 
the video in the presence of a confederate who they were led to believe was another 
participant recruited in the same manner as themselves. There were four female 
confederates, each of whom was randomly assigned to participate in a roughly equal 
number of trials (15 or 16). All participants then completed the practice task. 
Participants were told that the purpose of the practice task was to familiarise them 
with the format of the questions they would be answering on the cued recall task. 
While the practice task did include instructions about what coarse- and fine-grain 
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responses were, it was primarily a means for delivering social comparative feedback 
prior to the cued recall task. Participants in the two feedback conditions took turns 
with the confederate in verbally relaying their answers to the practice task questions 
in the presence of the experimenter. The experimenter asked the participant to begin, 
so that he/she always provided answers and confidence ratings before the confederate. 
Depending on the condition, the confederate either agreed or disagreed with the 
majority (4/6) of the fine-grain answers provided by the participant (by giving the 
same or a different answer), and expressed high confidence in these responses (by 
verbally stating a confidence rating of 80, 90 or 100%). Participants in the control 
condition did not report their answers to the practice questions aloud.  
After completing the practice task, all participants moved into another room to 
individually complete the cued recall task. In Phase I of the cued recall task, 
participants provided fine- and coarse-grain answers with confidence ratings ranging 
from 0-100% in 10% increments (higher ratings indicating higher confidence levels) 
to each of the 22 questions. Phase I of the task was forced-report, meaning 
participants had to provide both fine- and coarse grain answers before they could 
advance to the next phase. In Phase II, participants were presented with their answers 
from Phase I (without confidence ratings), and instructed to select either the fine- or 
coarse-grain response for each question as their final answer. Participants again 
provided confidence ratings for their volunteered answers. The instructions for Phase 
II were as follows: “Now I would like you to imagine that you are a real eyewitness to 
the crime you have just seen in the video. The police officer interviewing you requests 
that you choose ONE of the two answers that you provided to each of the questions 
above.”  Participants were also instructed to aim to be accurate and not guess when 
they were providing their answer. After selecting either the coarse- or fine-grain 
 17 
answer they volunteered in Phase I, participants moved to Phase III (note: in Phase II, 
an increase in fine-grain responding automatically resulted in a decrease in coarse-
grain responding). In Phase III, participants were shown the answers they provided in 
Phase II of the task (final answers), and were asked if they would prefer to withhold 
their responses to any of the questions. The instructions for Phase III were as follows: 
“You will now have a chance to review the final answers you have chosen. In this 
section, you have the option of choosing to refrain from responding to questions 
(choosing “I don’t know”) should you decide that the response you provided earlier is 
not suitable.” Previous research has shown that individuals can improve the accuracy 
of their memory reports if they have the option to withhold responses (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996). After completing the cued recall task, all participants were thanked 
and debriefed. The entire procedure took approximately 30 minutes. 
Results 
Data were roughly normally distributed with no outliers for any of the dependent 
variables. One-way ANOVAs were conducted comparing group means for the 
confirming feedback, disconfirming feedback, and control (no feedback) conditions 
for the following dependent variables: expressed confidence in the accuracy of fine- 
and coarse-grain responses at Phase I, grain-size volunteering at Phase II, response 
withholding (selection of ‘I don’t know’) at Phase III, and the accuracy of fine- and 
coarse-grain responses at Phase I. To control for increased error rate due to multiple 
comparisons, we applied a Bonferroni correction, dividing our standard alpha value of 
.05 by the number of statistical tests run (5). The result was a new alpha level of p = 
.01 to determine statistical significance. Table 1 shows control, disconfirming, and 
confirming group means and standard deviations for all dependent variables. Below, 
the results of the analyses are reported with conventional statistics alongside effect 
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sizes. 
< Table 1 here > 
 The results of the ANOVAs showed no significant difference between groups 
for coarse-grain, F(2, 89) = 3.32, p = .04, ω2 = .09 or fine-grain, F(2, 89) = 1.36, p = 
.26, ω2 = .01 confidence at Phase I. There was also no significant difference between 
groups for response withholding at Phase III, F(2, 89) = 2.28, p = .11, ω2 = .07. There 
was a significant effect of the manipulation on fine- and coarse-grain volunteering at 
Phase II, F(2, 89) = 4.95, p = .009, ω2 = .08, with a medium effect size (Kirk, 1996). 
A choice between fine- and coarse-grain answers was forced in Phase II, meaning that 
an increase in volunteering for one type of answer necessitated a decrease for the 
other. We followed up this significant ANOVA with t-tests to compare each of the 
groups on grain size volunteering. We ran three t-tests, which constituted a new 
family of statistical tests. The Bonferroni correction is very conservative, and 
therefore, we did not apply it for this series of t-tests, given that there were only three 
of them, and they followed a significant omnibus test for which the correction was 
applied. The results of the t-tests showed a significant difference between the control 
and disconfirming groups in volunteering of fine- and coarse grain responses, t(58) = 
3.06 p = .003, d = 0.78. Participants in the disconfirming feedback group volunteered 
more coarse-grain (M = 11.67, SD = 2.71), and fewer fine-grain (M = 10.33, SD = 
2.71) answers than participants in the control group (coarse-grain M = 9.50, SD = 
2.78; fine-grain M = 12.50, SD = 2.78). There was also a significant difference in 
volunteering of fine- and coarse-grain answers between participants in the confirming 
and disconfirming groups in, t(60) = -2.04, p = .045, d = -0.51.  Participants in the 
disconfirming feedback group also volunteered more coarse-grain and fewer fine-
grain answers than participants in the confirming group (coarse-grain M = 10.28, SD 
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= 2.63; fine-grain M = 11.72, SD = 2.63). There was no significant difference 
between participants in the control and confirming groups for fine- and coarse-grain 
volunteering at Phase II, t(60) = 1.14, p = .26, d = 0.28. There were no other 
significant differences between groups, or effect sizes of note, including for accuracy.  
Discussion 
The present research examined the effects of receiving confirming or 
disconfirming feedback about the accuracy of one’s memory on participants’ reported 
confidence, grain-size volunteering, and response withholding in a subsequent recall 
task. Consistent with our predictions, we found that participants in the disconfirming 
condition reported significantly fewer fine-grain details than participants in the 
confirming or control conditions. Contrary to expectations however, this decrease in 
fine-grain responding did not correspond with a decrease in participants’ expressed 
confidence in the accuracy of their fine-grain answers at Phase I. This is surprising, as 
previous research shows that fine-grain confidence at Phase I determines whether a 
fine-grain option is volunteered at Phase II (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008; 
Goldsmith, et al., 2002; Weber & Brewer, 2008). However, the finding is not without 
precedent, as in Rechdan et al. (2017) we found no effects of positive and negative 
computer mediated social comparative feedback on participants’ confidence in the 
accuracy of their memory reports. We expected that the manipulation in the present 
experiment, which involved a confederate challenging the participant on fine-grain 
details, would be quite salient, and result in reduced confidence for the accuracy of 
those details. Instead, the significant decrease in fine-grain volunteering in the 
absence of a decrease in confidence shown by participants in the disconfirming group 
suggests that the social feedback manipulation had an effect on participants’ 
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metacognitive control decisions (grain size volunteering), but no effect on their 
metacognitive monitoring (as reflected by subjective confidence). 
Disagreement with the co-witness (confederate) over the majority of answers 
on the practice task may have affected participants’ memory self-efficacy. Feedback 
from others can affect memory self-efficacy (Berry, 1999); and memory self-efficacy 
impacts memory performance (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011). Decreased memory 
self-efficacy may have led participants in the disconfirming feedback group to take a 
more cautious approach to reporting, if only because coarse-grain responses are more 
likely to be accurate than fine-grain responses (Yaniv & Foster, 1995, 1997). Future 
research should examine the role of memory self-efficacy in metamemorial decision-
making.   
Alternatively, the results can be explained in terms of effects on control 
sensitivity, or the degree to which memory reporting is guided by metacognitive 
monitoring assessments (Goldmsith, Pansky, & Koriat, 2014). It is possible that 
disconfirming feedback altered the usually strong correspondence between 
participants’ confidence in the accuracy of their fine-grain responses (monitoring 
assessment), and their decision to volunteer these responses (control decision). 
Goldsmith et al., (2014) note that rememberers may rely strongly on their confidence 
assessments because they have “no access to the diagnosticity of their monitoring or 
because they have no better alternative (pp. 485)”. It is possible that participants 
viewed the feedback they received from the confederate as diagnostic of the quality of 
their memory for the stimulus event. Participants in the disconfirming condition may 
have came to believe that their monitoring assessments did not reliably predict the 
accuracy of their recall, and they were thus less likely to rely on these assessments 
when making decisions about what to report on the cued recall task. Further research 
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is needed to measure control sensitivity in the various social contexts in which 
memory reporting can occur.  
Finally, it is important to note that descriptively, participants in the confirming 
feedback condition also volunteered fewer fine-grain responses than those in the 
control group. While this difference was not significant in the present experiment, it 
merits further investigation. One possible explanation for this pattern is that publicly 
reporting results and engaging in comparison with the confederate placed an emphasis 
on accuracy, thereby changing participants’ perception of the standards of memory 
reporting. Previous research has shown that public (as opposed to private) reporting 
can influence metacognitive monitoring and control decisions, such as the precision 
with which rememberers report details from memory, as well as the level of 
confidence participants express in the accuracy of their recall (McCallum et al., 2016; 
Shaw et al., 2007). Another possible explanation is that participants in the confirming 
group also experienced some degree of disagreement with the confederate (on 2 out of 
the 6 practice task questions). This mild level of disagreement may have resulted in an 
effect similar to that experienced by participants in the disconfirming group, albeit a 
less impactful one. The latter explanation fits with the observed pattern of the group 
means for fine-grain volunteering; disconfirming < confirming < control.  
Limitations 
 A potential limitation of this experiment is that all of the confederates were 
female, and less than a third of participants were male. Carli (2001) notes that males 
are generally more influential than women, and tend to resist influence by women. It 
is therefore possible that the results presented here are tempered by the gender of our 
influencers (confederates). Future research examining the role of social influence on 
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metamemory, as well as potential replications of this work should involve an equal 
number of confederates and participants of both genders. 
Furthermore, participants in this experiment were not re-questioned about the 
details for which they received feedback from a confederate. This element of the 
experimental design, though deliberate, may limit the generalizability of our results. 
We were interested in examining the effects of disagreement or agreement with a co-
witness—not exposure to misinformation—on participants’ subsequent memory 
reports. However, in real life investigations, witnesses may be questioned about 
details of an event that they have already discussed with a co-witness. Further 
research is needed to determine the effects of receiving PEI (including 
misinformation) from a co-witness on participants’ subsequent metamemorial 
reporting strategies regarding the details discussed.  
Conclusion 
 The results of this experiment show that disagreement between co-witnesses 
(on items unrelated to the test items) may affect their subsequent memory reports, 
leading them to limit the level of detail they choose to volunteer. This potential for 
discussion between co-witnesses to affect their individual metacognitive control 
strategies for memory reporting merits further investigation. These results further our 
understanding of how rememberers regulate memory reporting in the social contexts 
in which it often occurs.  
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Table 1  
Means, Standard Deviations, and 95% Confidence Intervals for Control, Confirming and Disconfirming Conditions  
 
Note. CI = confidence interval; CG = coarse-grain; FG = fine-grain. Means in a row sharing the same superscript differ at p < .05.  
 Control (n = 30) Confirming (n = 32) Disconfirming (n = 30) 
Dependent variable M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
Phase I CG confidence 72.54 (11.27) [68.34; 76.76] 78.91 (8.50) [75.84; 81.97] 73.59 (11.50) [69.30; 77.88] 
Phase I FG confidence 65.52 (10.60) [61.56; 69.48] 69.26 (10.20) [65.58; 72.94] 65.18 (11.73) [60.80; 69.56] 
Phase II CG volunteering 9.50 (2.78)a [8.46; 10.54] 10.28 (2.63)b [9.33; 11.23] 11.67 (2.71)a, b [10.66; 12.68] 
Phase II FG volunteering 12.50 (2.78)a [11.46; 13.54] 11.72 (2.63)b [10.77; 12.67] 10.33 (2.71)a, b [9.32; 11.34] 
Phase III withholding 6.30 (2.87) [5.23; 7.37] 5.75 (2.74) [4.76; 6.74] 7.37 (3.43) [6.09; 8.65] 
Phase I CG accuracy 16.43 (3.09) [15.28; 17.59] 17.41 (2.18) [16.62; 18.20] 16.67 (2.83) [15.61; 17.72] 
Phase I FG accuracy 12.87 (3.01) [11.74; 14.00] 13.22 (2.85) [12.20; 14.25] 12.57 (3.14) [11.40; 13.74] 
